Efficiency defense: Possible mitigating effects in presence of imperfect redistribution tools

Cyril Hariton () and Gwenael Piaser ()

No 2006_31, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: It is often argued that, first, the decision criterion of antitrust authorities should be total social welfare and that, second, mergers increasing the value of this criterion but ending with lower consumer surplus should be allowed in the name of efficiency gains realized by merging firms. This paper studies merger control by a government with, first, preferences over wealth distribution among agents (weights to put on consume surplus and firms profit) and, second, imperfect redistribution tools. It shows that in such a case merger policy can not be parted off redistribution policy.

Keywords: Surplus Analysis; Merging Analysis; Redistribution; Distortive Taxation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D61 L49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_31

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