On multiple agent models of moral hazard

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenael Piaser () and Uday Rajan
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Uday Rajan: Ross School of Business, University of Michigan

No 2006_32, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: In multiple principal, multiple agent models of moral hazard, we provide conditions under which the outcomes of equilibria in direct mechanisms are preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. We discuss the role of random allocations and recommendations and relate the result to the existing literature.

Keywords: Moral Hazard; Multiple Agents; Direct Mechanism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_32

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