A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard

Andrea Attar, Nicolás Porteiro and Gwenael Piaser (gwenael.piaser@ipag.fr)

No 2006_36, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: We consider Common Agency games of moral hazard and we suggest that there is only a very weak support for the standard restriction to take-it or leave-it contracts.

Keywords: Menus; Common Agency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_36

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