Non-exclusivity and adverse selection: An application to the annuity market

Agar Brugiavini and Gwenael Piaser ()

No 2006_39, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: Using a common agency framework, we characterize possible equilibria when annuities contracts are not exclusive. We discuss theoretical and empirical implications of these equilibria. First, we show that at equilibrium prices are not linear. Then we characterize an equilibrium. We provide conditions for existence and show that this equilibrium is efficient.

Keywords: Menus; Common Agency; Insurance; Annuity Markets; Adverse Selection; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G1 H5 J2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: Nonexclusivity and adverse selection: An application to the annuity market (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_39

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