Incentives and Institutions. A Bottom-up Approach to Climate Policy
Carlo Carraro ()
No 2006_49, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"
Abstract:
This paper comments and assesses �Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures�, a paper that David Victor presented at the international workshop on "Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World", organized by Joe Aldy and Rob Stavins at the J.F. Kennedy School of Government in May 2006. By analyzing Victor�s proposals for an effective climate agreement post 2012, this paper emphasizes the contribution that game-theoretical analyses have provided to the design of climate agreements. It therefore emphasizes how incentives and institutions play a crucial role in affecting the final outcome of negotiations on climate change control, and how incentives and institutions can be modified to achieve a better control of climate change. This paper also discusses a wider policy approach that can enhance the effectiveness of measures designed to address the climate change problem.
Keywords: Agreements; Climate; Incentives; Negotiations; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H23 Q25 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_49
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