Externality Control and Endogenous Market Structure under Uncertainty: the Price vs. Quantity dilemma
Luca Di Corato () and
Yishay Maoz
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Luca Di Corato: Department of Economics, Ca' Foscari University of Venice
No 2022: 13, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"
Abstract:
In a competitive industry where production entails a negative externality, a welfare-maximizing regulator considers, as control instruments, setting a cap on the industry output or levying an output tax. We embed this scenario within a dynamic setup where market demand is stochastic and market entry is irreversible. We firstly determine the industry equilibrium under each policy and then determine the cap level and the tax rate which maximize welfare in each case. We show that a first-best outcome can be achieved through the tax policy while the cap policy may only qualify as a second-best alternative.
Keywords: Investment; Uncertainty; Caps; Taxes; Competition; Externalities; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D41 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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Related works:
Journal Article: Externality control and endogenous market structure under uncertainty: The price vs. quantity dilemma (2023) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2022:13
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