Optimal Inspection of Rumors in Networks

Luca Merlino and Nicole Tabasso

No 2022: 19, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: We study the diffusion of a true and a false message when agents are (i) biased towards one of the messages and (ii) agents are able to inspect messages for veracity. Inspection of messages implies that a higher rumor prevalence may increase the prevalence of the truth. We employ this result to discuss how a planner may optimally choose information inspection rates of the population. We find that a planner who aims to maximize the prevalence of the truth may find it optimal to allow rumors to circulate.

Keywords: Social Networks; Rumors; Scrutiny (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-net
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