Tullock Contest with Desert Concerns

Francesco Fallucchi and Francesco Trevisan ()
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Francesco Trevisan: Department of Economics, Ca' Foscari University of Venice

No 2023: 31, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: We study the Tullock contest model with desert concerns (Gill and Stone (2010)). In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players and convex effort costs, we establish the conditions necessary for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of desert concerns on players' spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.

Keywords: rent-seeking; contest; asymmetry; desire to win; loss aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2023:31

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