A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting

Francesco De Sinopoli and Claudia Meroni

No 01/2017, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: A basic problem in voting theory is that all the strategy profiles in which nobody is pivotal are Nash equilibria. We study elections where voters decide simultaneously on several binary issues. We extend the concept of conditional sincerity introduced by Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) and propose an intuitive and simple criterion to refine equilibria in which players are not pivotal. This is shown to have a foundation in a refinement of perfection that takes into account the material voting procedure. We prove that in large elections the proposed solution is characterized through a weaker definition of Condorcet winner and always survives sophisticated voting.

Keywords: Voting theory; multi-issue elections; strategic voting; perfect equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Journal Article: A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting (2018)
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