Miscarriage of Justice in Judges' Mind: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Stefania Ottone (), Ferruccio Ponzano (), Margherita Saraceno () and Luca Zarri
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Stefania Ottone: University of Milan Bicocca
Ferruccio Ponzano: University of Eastern Piedmont
Margherita Saraceno: University of Pavia

No 03/2022, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate – both theoretically and by means of a controlled lab experiment – judges’ decisions when either “type-I” errors (i.e. convicting an innocent defendant) or “type-II” errors (i.e. acquitting a guilty defendant) can occur. Addressing this issue with field data is extremely challenging. Taken together, our findings indicate that participants are sensitive to both types of error, rather than to type-I avoidance only. Next, in both scenarios we interestingly detect “compensatory leniency” in judicial decision making, with participants seeming to balance the inherent trade-off between the errors by jointly managing the two key levers they are provided wiggle room on by our design: decision over (i) conviction/acquittal and (ii) severity of punishment. Finally, we show that participants are willing to pay to get further evidence and eliminate both type-I and type-II errors. We discuss implications of our core results for the design of behaviorally informed deterrence policies.

Keywords: Judicial Errors; Miscarriage of Justice; Economic Experiments; Law and Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 K42 K49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-law
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