EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Happiness and Tax Morale: an Empirical Analysis

Diego Lubian and Luca Zarri

No 04/2011, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents empirical evidence that \tax morale" - taxpayers' intrinsic motivation to pay taxes - constitutes a new determinant of happiness, even after controlling for several demographic and socioeconomic factors. Using data on Italian households for 2004, we assess the strength of tax morale by relying on single items as well as composite multi-item indices. Our main result that scal honesty generates a higher hedonic payo than cheating is in line with Harbaugh et al. (2007)'s neuroeconomic nding. Further, it sheds light on the well-known \puzzle of compliance", that is the fact that many individuals pay taxes even when expected penalty and audit probability are extremely low: tax compliance is less puzzling once we show that not only it is materially costly, but also provides sizeable non-pecuniary bene ts that make it rewarding in itself.

Keywords: Happiness; Tax Morale; Tax Compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hap, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dse.univr.it//workingpapers/LZ_2011.pdf First version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Happiness and tax morale: An empirical analysis (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Happiness and Tax Morale: an Empirical Analysis (2011) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ver:wpaper:04/2011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Reiter ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:ver:wpaper:04/2011