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Deep Pockets, Extreme Preferences: Explaining Persistent Differences in Electoral Contributions Across Industries

Thomas Bassetti () and Filippo Pavesi

No 04/2014, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: When considering contributions to electoral campaigns in the U.S., a puzzling regularity is that some industries tend to spend significantly more than others. To explain this evidence, we present a simple theoretical model in which interest groups finance politicians that require funding for campaign advertising in exchange for policy favors. Our model predicts that interest groups with more extreme preferences will devote a greater amount of resources to campaign financing. The empirical evidence, based on data from the U.S. House elections between 2000 and 2004, strongly supports this finding.

Keywords: Campaign Finance; Interest Groups; Elections; Extreme Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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