Extreme events, ex post renegotiation and vagueness of campaign promises

Elena Manzoni

No 10/2020, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper considers the effect of extreme ex-post realizations of the state of the world on implemented policies. I model a unilateral renegotiation process through which the elected politician may deviate from his set of promised policies, as long as the majority of voters are as well off. I show that the possibility of renegotiation decreases ex-ante discretion of the candidates and increases their ex-post one. Moreover, in the presence of convex costs of renegotiation, extremist candidates are more constrained ex-ante, but may implement extremist policies ex post.

Keywords: Unilateral renegotiation; discretion; electoral campaigns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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