Collective Household Welfare and Intra-household Inequality

Jean-Paul Chavas (), Martina Menon (), Elisa Pagani () and Federico Perali

No 13/2015, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: We investigate the relationship between the individual and household indirect utility functions in the context of a collective household model. Our analysis produces new results that explain how the rule governing the distribution of resources within household members is related to the measurement of household welfare and intra-household inequality. By examining the relationship between centralized and decentralized pro- gram, we show that, in general, income shares are equal to the product of two weights: the Pareto weight and a weight reflecting income effects across individuals. For a weighted Bergsonian representation of household utility and general assumptions about individual preferences, we derive the associated household welfare functions and intra-household inequality measures belonging to a family of entropy indexes.

Keywords: Collective household model; Pareto weight; Sharing rule. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D12 D13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Collective household welfare and intra-household inequality (2018)
Working Paper: Collective Household Welfare and Intra-household Inequality (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ver:wpaper:13/2015

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