Cost Overrun and Auction Format in Public Works

Alessandro Bucciol, Ottorino Chillemi () and Giacomo Palazzi ()
Additional contact information
Ottorino Chillemi: University of Padua
Giacomo Palazzi: Generali group

No 17/2011, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the effect on cost overruns of auction formats (average bid as opposed to first price rule) conditional on the entry mechanisms (open as opposed to restricted participation). The dataset is a panel of auctions held in the Italian Veneto region between 2004 and 2006. It includes small size public projects (with reserve price up to one million euros) in such sectors as road works and building maintenance. It is commonly believed that cost overruns are lower under average bid auctions relative to fi rst price auctions. We fi nd support to this belief only when participation to the auction is restricted.

Keywords: cost overrun; average bid; first price; free entry; work delays (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2011-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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