Electoral incentives in small polities: a case study

Francesco De Sinopoli () and Diego Lubian
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Francesco De Sinopoli: Department of Economics (University of Verona)

No 18/2020, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: It is well known, from the pioneering work of Lizzeri and Persico (2001) on, that in winner-take-all systems office-motivated politicians prefer to underprovide public goods in favor of pork-barrel spending. Believing that similar incentives are present even in small polities, we analyze a policy proposal in a medium-sized Department of Economics obtaining results in line with the empirical literature on government spending.

Keywords: Polity; Electoral Incentives; Public goods provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-pol
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