Almost transferable utility, changes in production possibilities, and the Nash Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions

Elisabeth Gugl

No 702, Department Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Victoria

Abstract: Consider a two-person economy in which allocative efficiency is independent of distribution but cardinality of the agents' utility functions precludes transferable utility. I show that both agents either benefit or lose with any change of production possibilities under the Nash Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions.

Keywords: Axiomatic bargaining; resource monotonicity; transferable utility; risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D13 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2007-08-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
Note: ISSN 1914-2838
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vic:vicddp:0702

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