Multiagent System Simulations of Sealed-Bid Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals

Alan Mehlenbacher ()
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Alan Mehlenbacher: Department of Economics, University of Victoria, https://www.uvic.ca/socialsciences/economics/

No 707, Department Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Victoria

Abstract: This study uses a multiagent system to investigate how sealed-bid auction results vary across twodimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value percent increases, profit, revenue, and efficiency all decrease monotonically, but they decrease in different ways. Finally, I find that forcing revelation by the auction winner of the true common value may have beneficial revenue effects when the common-value percent is high and there is a high degree of uncertainty about the common value.

Keywords: Axiomatic bargaining; resource monotonicity; transferable utility; risk aversion; Agent-based computational economics; multi-dimensional value signals; sealed-bid auctions; impulse balance learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C15 C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2007-11-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
Note: ISSN 1914-2838
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vic:vicddp:0707

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