Community Preferences, Insurgency, and the Success of Reconstruction Spending

David Scoones and Travers Barclay Child

No 1202, Department Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Victoria

Abstract: A model of reconstruction spending by an occupying force is developed, in which the local population may have different preferences over the allocation of spending than the occupier. When the spending allocation is misaligned with local preferences an insurgency among some members of the community may result. Depending on the effectiveness of the insurgency, local opposition may constrain the ability of the occupier to implement its most preferred spending allocation. In equilibrium, the occupier may tolerate some level of insurgency to approach its ideal, but naive insistence on a most preferred allocation may lead to fewer projects of any kind being completed. The model suggests that winning the hearts and minds of a local population is less a question of how much money is invested in reconstruction than of how that money is allocated across projects of different kinds.

Keywords: development and insurgency; conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H56 N4 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2012-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm
Note: ISSN 1914-2838
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Community preferences, insurgency, and the success of reconstruction spending (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vic:vicddp:1202

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