Credible collusion in a model of spacial competition

Raquel Arévalo and José María Chamorro Rivas

No 404, Working Papers from Universidade de Vigo, Departamento de Economía Aplicada

Abstract: In a spatial model with quantity setting firms, we analyze the possibility of cooperation in a long term relationship, where firms compete in location. It is found that endogeneizing the location decisions makes collusion more difficult.

Keywords: Supergames; spatial competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2004-05
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Journal Article: Credible collusion in a model of spatial competition* (2007)
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