Informal influence in the Asian Development Bank
Christopher Kilby ()
No 13, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series from Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics
Through case studies and empirical analysis, scholars have uncovered convincing evidence that individual donors influence lending decisions of international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Less clear are the mechanisms by which donors exert influence. Potential mechanisms are either formal or informal. Formal influence is through official decisions of the board of executive directors while informal influence covers all other channels. This paper explores the role of informal influence at the Asian Development Bank by examining the flow of funds after loans are approved. Controlling for commitments (loan approvals), are subsequent disbursements linked to the interests of the key shareholders, Japan and the U.S.? I compare these findings with results for the World Bank and consider implications for institutional reforms.
Keywords: Asian Development Bank; Donor Influence; Japan; United States; UN voting; World Bank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F35 F53 F55 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Informal influence in the Asian Development Bank (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vil:papers:13
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