Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions

Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt

Virginia Economics Online Papers from University of Virginia, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper reports laboratory data for a series of two-person games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment for which behavior conforms quite nicely to the predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case we change a key payoff parameter in a manner that does not alter the equilibrium predictions, but this theoretically neutral payoff change has a major (often dramatic) effect on observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple economic intuition and with a model of iterated noisy introspection for one-shot games.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; noncooperative games; experiments; bounded rationality; introspection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages JEL Classification: C72, C92
Date: 2000-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.as.virginia.edu/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap333.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions (2004)
Journal Article: Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vir:virpap:333

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Virginia Economics Online Papers from University of Virginia, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Debby Stanford (djb4c@virginia.edu).