Pricing, product diversity, and search costs: a Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond model

Simon Anderson and Régis Renault

Virginia Economics Online Papers from University of Virginia, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study price competition in the presence of search costs and product differentiation. The limit cases of the model are the ‘‘Bertrand Paradox,’’ the ‘‘Diamond Paradox,’’ and Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. Market prices rise with search costs and decrease with the number of firms. Prices may initially fall with the degree of product differentiation because more diversity leads to more search and hence more competition. Equilibrium diversity rises with search costs, while the optimum level falls, so entry is excessive. The market failure is most pronounced for low preference for variety and high search costs.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1999-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (253)

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http://repec.as.virginia.edu/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap335.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Pricing, Product Diversity, and Search Costs: A Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model (1999)
Working Paper: Pricing, Product Diversity and Search Costs: A Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vir:virpap:335

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