A Model of Noisy Introspection

Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt

Virginia Economics Online Papers from University of Virginia, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a theoretical model of noisy introspection designed to explain behavior in games played only once. The equilibrium determines layers of beliefs about others' beliefs about ..., etc., but allows for surprises by relaxing the equilibrium requirement that belief distributions coincide with decision distributions. The paper contains a convergence proof and reports estimated introspection and error parameters for data from 37 one-shot matrix games. The accuracy of the model is compared with that of two alternative approaches: the Nash equilibrium and the logit quantal response equilibrium.

Keywords: game theory; introspection; Nash equilibrium; experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2000-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://repec.as.virginia.edu/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap343.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A model of noisy introspection (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vir:virpap:343

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