Search, Applications and Vacancies

Steven Stern (steven.stern@stonybrook.edu)

Virginia Economics Online Papers from University of Virginia, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines a generalized rivalry problem in the labour market. It employs a simple labour supply model as a framework to analyse labour markets characterized by search with competition among searchers. First, the labour market process for new hires is described. The searching worker's opportunities are determined by the market parameter which is the probability that an application will not generate a job offer. The model is closed by determining the value of the market parameter given the search strategy that each worker individually follows. There exists a non-trivial eqUilibrium in steady state. At this equilibrium a social planner can improve each worker's welfare by inducing each worker to search less intensively.

Keywords: search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1990
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.as.virginia.edu/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap398.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vir:virpap:398

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Virginia Economics Online Papers from University of Virginia, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Debby Stanford (djb4c@virginia.edu).