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Which market protocols facilitate fair trading?

Marco LiCalzi and Paolo Pellizzari

No 151, Working Papers from Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

Abstract: We study the performance of four market protocols with regard to their ability to equitably distribute the gains from trade among two groups of participants in an exchange economy. We test the protocols by running (computerized) experiments. Assuming Walrasian tatonemment as benchmark, there is a clear-cut ranking from best to worst: batch auction, nondiscretionary dealership, the hybridization of a dealership and a continuous double auction, and finally the pure continuous double auction.

Keywords: allocative efficiency; allocative fairness; allocative neutrality; comparison of market institutions; market microstructure; performance criteria. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 D69 G19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp and nep-mst
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in A. Consiglio (ed.), Artificial Markets Modeling, Springer, 2007, 81-97

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Related works:
Chapter: Which Market Protocols Facilitate Fair Trading? (2007)
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