Target-based solutions for Nash bargaining

Lorenzo Bastianello () and Marco LiCalzi
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Lorenzo Bastianello: EDE-EM, Universite Paris 1-Pantheon-Sorbonne

No 5, Working Papers from Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

Abstract: We revisit the Nash model for two-person bargaining. A mediator knows agents' ordinal preferences over feasible proposals, but has incomplete information about their acceptance thresholds. We provide a behavioural characterisation under which the mediator recommends a proposal that maximises the probability that bargainers strike an agreement. Some major solutions are recovered as special cases; in particular, we offer a straightforward interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution.

Keywords: cooperative bargaining; target-based preferences; Nash solution; egalitarian and utilitarian solutions; mediation; copulas. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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