The probability to reach an agreement as a foundation for axiomatic bargaining

Lorenzo Bastianello () and Marco LiCalzi
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Lorenzo Bastianello: LEMMA Universite Paris 2 Pantheon-Assas

No 2, Working Papers from Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

Abstract: We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. This probability-based approach nests both the standard and the ordinal Nash solution, and yet need not assume that bargainers have preferences over lotteries or that choice sets are convex. We consider both mediator-assisted bargaining and standard unassisted bargaining. We solve a long-standing puzzle and offer a natural interpretation of the product operator underlying the Nash solution. We characterize other known solution concepts, including the egalitarian and the utilitarian solutions.

Keywords: cooperative bargaining; mediation; arbitration; benchmarking; copulas. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D74 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-upt
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https://www.unive.it/web/fileadmin/user_upload/dip ... rs/2018/2018wp02.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vnm:wpdman:150

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