Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation

Antonio Romero-Medina () and Matteo Triossi
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Antonio Romero-Medina: Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

No 13, Working Papers from Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

Abstract: We present the conditional acceptance mechanism for the course allocation problem. This mechanism combines features of the immediate acceptance and the student optimal stable mechanisms. It implements the set of stable allocations in both Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under substitutable preferences and priorities. We model the post-allocation adjustment mechanism using a repeated version of the mechanism. This repeated mechanism reduces the wastefulness of out-of-equilibrium play and implements the set of stable allocation in Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium under slot-speci#c preferences and priorities. Both mechanisms are easily implementable, reduce the complexity of eliciting students' preferences, and mimic the features of the mechanisms currently in use.

Keywords: conditional acceptance; immediate acceptance; multi-unit assignment problem; stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2022-09
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Journal Article: Strategic priority-based course allocation (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vnm:wpdman:199

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