EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Behavioral Economics of Crime Rates and Punishment Levels

Saori Chiba () and Kaiwen Leong ()
Additional contact information
Kaiwen Leong: Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University

No 21, Working Papers from Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

Abstract: Empirical studies have shown, paradoxically, that increasing the probability of apprehension can correlate with an increase in the total number of criminal actions. To examine this phenomenon, this paper develops a theory of "personal rules" based on the tradeoff between oneÕs self-image of criminal productivity and the temptation Ð salience of the present Ð of taking the easy way out by committing a crime. This theory analyzes transformation of lapses into precedents that undermine future self-restraint. The foundation for this transformation is imperfect recall of oneÕs own criminal productivity within certain defined parameters, which leads people to draw inaccurate inferences from their past actions. Rationalization may lead to overestimation of the expected utility of committing a crime when the opportunity presents itself.

Keywords: Crime; Imperfect Recall; Willpower. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D81 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-law and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://virgo.unive.it/wpideas/storage/2014wp21.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Behavioral Economics of Crime Rates and Punishment Levels (2016) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vnm:wpdman:92

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marco LiCalzi ().

 
Page updated 2022-06-26
Handle: RePEc:vnm:wpdman:92