A regulator's bark can be more effective than its bite

Laura Hubbard

No 372504, Competition & Regulation Times from New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation

Abstract: Regulators often act. But they can also simply threaten to act. Laura Hubbard outlines some general principles associated with such a strategy - and explores particular case studies.

Date: 2009-03-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vuw:vuwcrt:372504

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