Should collusion be illegal when it improves economic effeciency?

Neil Quigley and Lewis Evans

No 373806, Competition & Regulation Times from New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation

Abstract: Economic efficiency was increased by collusion relating to the removal of a free car wash offer in Auckland, argue Professors Lewis Evans and Neil Quigley. They suggest that punishing collusion that increases economic efficiency calls into question the deeming provisions of section 30 of the Commerce Act, and the validity of a process that considers harm when assessing the penalty, but not when deciding liability.

Date: 2000-10-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vuw:vuwcrt:373806

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