Motivating agent effort in a competitive environment

Neil Quigley, Ignatius Hortsmann and Frank Mathewson

No 375407, Competition & Regulation Times from New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation

Abstract: In the investment-fund life-insurance and cellular phone industries, sales agents' contracts include both commission payments for sales and clawbacks of those payments if the clients are not retained. Neil Quigley, Ignatius Hortsmann and Frank Mathewson explain why - and they also show how a major shift in market conditions changed the structure of these contracts.

Date: 2005-11-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vuw:vuwcrt:375407

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