Does substitute trading make insider-trading regulation ineffective?

Hui Huang

No 375905, Competition & Regulation Times from New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation

Abstract: Insider-trading regulation is intended to prevent a firm's insiders from using superior information to obtain excess profits at the expense of outside shareholders. But information advantages can be exploited in other ways, such as by trading in the securities of related firms. Consequently, as Hui Huang explains, the regulation of insider trading can have perverse consequences.

Date: 2007-07-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/crt/article/view/3759

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vuw:vuwcrt:375905

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Competition & Regulation Times from New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Library Technology Services ().