EU Analysis on Regulation Ownership & Institutions

Carlo Cambini

No 19284, Working Paper Series from Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation

Abstract: How can the state regulate the firms it also runs? Professor Cambini presents recent evidence based on EU utilities and telecom companies showing the interplay between independent regulation, ownership and political institutions. In particular, he focuses on the effect of ownership on capital structure decisions, firm market value and investment. He also highlights the circumstances in which political interference through firm ownership is most likely to occur and affect regulatory interventions.

Keywords: regulation; energy; ownership; investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vuw:vuwcsr:19284

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