Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan

Yasushi Asako (), Takeshi Iida (), Tetsuya Matsubayashi and Michiko Ueda ()
Additional contact information
Takeshi Iida: Faculty of Law, Doshisha University
Michiko Ueda: Department of Political Science, Syracuse University

No 1412, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: Dynastic politicians, defined as those whose family members have also served in the same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of offices in many parts of the world. We develop a model of how dynastic politicians with inherited political advantages affect electoral outcomes and policy choices. Our model predicts that, as compared wit non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. We test the implications of the model using data from Japan between 1997 and 2007.

Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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