A new basis and the Shapley value

Koji Yokote (), Yukihiko Funaki () and Yoshio Kamijo
Additional contact information
Koji Yokote: Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University

No 1418, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new basis of the set of all TU games. Shapley (1953) introduced the unanimity game inwhich cooperation of all players in a given coalition yields payoff. We introduce the commander game in which only one player in a given coalition yields payoff. The set of the commander games forms a basis and has two properties. First, when we express a game by a linear combination of the basis, the coefficients related to singletons coincide with the Shapley value. Second, the basis induces the null space of the Shapley value.

Keywords: TU game; Shapley value; Basis; Null space (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.waseda.jp/fpse/winpec/assets/uploads/20 ... te_Funaki_Kamijo.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A new basis and the Shapley value (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wap:wpaper:1418

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haruko Noguchi ().