One-sided Games in a War of Attrition

Yasushi Asako ()

No 1420, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: This study develops a war-of-attrition model with the asymmetric feature that one player can be defeated by the other but not vice versa; that is, only one player has an exogenous probability of being forced to capitulate. With complete information, the equilibria are almost identical to the canonical war-of-attrition model. On the other hand, with incomplete information on a player's robustness, a war where both players fight for some duration emerges. Moreover, a player who is never defeated may capitulate in equilibrium, and this player will give in earlier if the other player's fighting costs are greater.

Keywords: war; attrition; Bayesian learning; asymmetric robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2015-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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http://www.waseda.jp/fpse/winpec/assets/uploads/20 ... 420Yasushi-Asako.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: One-Sided Games in a War of Attrition (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wap:wpaper:1420

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