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Weak Surplus Mononicity characterizes convex combination of egalitarian Shapley value and Consensus value

Koji Yokote () and Yukihiko Funaki ()
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Koji Yokote: Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University

No 1504, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: We deal with the problem of striking a balance between marginalism and egalitarianism in the class of TU cooperative games. Weintroduce a new axiom, Weak Surplus Monotonicity. It states that if the marginal contribution of a player increases, the worth of the grand coalition increases and the cooperative surplus increases, then the payoff of the player should also increase. We show that a solution satisfies Efficiency, Symmetry and Weak Surplus Monotonicity if and only if it is a convex combination of the Shapley value, the Equal division and the CIS value. By replacing the new axiom with a stronger axiom and taking the dual, we obtain 11 characterizations of solutions, including the results of Young (1985) or Casajus and Huettner (2014).

Keywords: TU game; Shapley value; Monotonicity; Axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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