Can Firms with Political Connections Borrow More Than Those Without? Evidence from Firm-Level Data for Indonesia
Jiangtao Fu (),
Daichi Shimamoto () and
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Jiangtao Fu: Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University
No 1513, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics
Using a unique firm-level dataset for the manufacturing sector in Indonesia, we examine how firms’ political and economic connections affect their access to finance. We determine individual firms’ political connections by identifying whether the government owns shares in the firm, whether politicians are on its board of directors, and whether highly-ranked managers personally know any politicians. We find that politically connected firms are more likely to be able to borrow from state-owned banks. Moreover, being connected to the government raises the probability that a firm can receive the full loan amount it applied for. The improvement in access to finance from political connections is more prominent for SMEs than for large firms. Furthermore, such improvement mostly comes from personal connections with politicians rather than more formal connections measured by the government ownership or politicians on the board of directors.
Keywords: Political Connections; Credit Constraints; Small and Medium Enterprises; Indonesia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 H11 L53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
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Journal Article: Can firms with political connections borrow more than those without? Evidence from firm-level data for Indonesia (2017)
Working Paper: Can Firms with Political Connections Borrow More Than Those Without? Evidence from firm-level data for Indonesia (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wap:wpaper:1513
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