The Unbinding Core for Coalitional Form Games
Takaaki Abe () and
Yukihiko Funaki ()
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Takaaki Abe: JSPS Research Fellow. Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University.
Yukihiko Funaki: School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University.
No 1805, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics
In this paper, we introduce a new concept of core by extending the de nition of deviation. The traditional de nition of deviation allows for players to deviate if some pro table allocation exists after their deviation, while our new de nition requires that all possible allocations are pro table. Hence, our core becomes a superset of the traditional core. We examine some properties that our new core satis es and provide a sufficient condition for being nonempty. Moreover, we apply Ray's (1989) credibility to our core.
Keywords: cooperative game; core; credibility; deviation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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