Unstructured Bargaining Experiment on Three-person Cooperative Games

Taro Shinoda () and Yukihiko Funaki ()
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Taro Shinoda: Waseda University

No 1915, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: In the cooperative game theory, we study only how to distribute payoffs by assuming that the grand coalition is formed. However, in real bargaining situation, the payoff distribution is considered with the coalition formation simultaneously. The players can make not only the grand coalition but also smaller coalitions. Also, they have to reach an agreement on just one payoff distribution. In order to know what happens in this situation, we design and run a laboratory experiment. As experimental results, we find the following things. First, the grand coalition is more likely to be formed when the core is non-empty than empty. Availability of the chat window is also positively correlated with formation of the grand coalition. Second, the payoff distribution the subjects agree with is depending on their power in bargaining. Unlike the others' bargaining experiment, the equal division is not very frequently adopted.

Keywords: laboratory experiment; cooperative game; coalition formation; payoff distribution; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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