"Thou shalt not leech" Are digital pirates conditional cooperators?

Wojciech Hardy, Michal Krawczyk and Joanna Tyrowicz

No 2015-26, Working Papers from Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw

Abstract: In this project we investigate willingness to share and download cultural content by implementing a novel "piracy game" modelled after standard public good games. Subjects' decisions have real consequence, as they are rewarded with individual "transfer" on a file-sharing service. We find that willingness to share depends positively on the sharing by others. Interestingly, however, this tendency does not seem to be associated with reciprocity or other-regarding social preferences. We employ several measures of sharing - from self-reporting to experimental - and incorporate to the analysis other factors which may explain the autonomous willingness to share, irrespective of the group effects. We find that conditional cooperation in content sharing is fairly prevalent, but unrelated to personality traits, attitude towards risk, attitude towards the other, marginal valuation, as well as socio-demographic characteristics.

Keywords: digital piracy; Big Five; public goods; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:war:wpaper:2015-26

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