Time Pressure and Risk Taking in Auctions: A Field Experiment
Anouar El Haji (),
Michal Krawczyk (),
Marta Sylwestrzak () and
Additional contact information
Anouar El Haji: Amsterdam Business School, University of Amsterdam
No 2016-04, Working Papers from Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw
Auctions often require risk taking under time pressure. However, little is known about how time pressure moderates the relationship between uncertainty of outcomes and bidding behavior. This study consists of a field experiment in which participants are invited to a Vickrey auction to elicit their willingness to pay for a lottery ticket. The time available to place a bid and also the skewness of the lottery (holding the expected value constant) are systematically manipulated. We find that under high time pressure participants are less likely to place a bid at all. Furthermore, participants who do place a bid under high time pressure bid significantly less than participants under low time pressure. The main finding is thus that increased time pressure significantly decreases risk taking. The effect seems to be particularly strong for the lottery with a high probability of winning and for female subjects.
Keywords: Internet auctions; Vickrey auction; risk taking; time pressure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed
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http://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/index.php/download_file/2438/ First version, 2016 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Time pressure and risk taking in auctions: A field experiment (2019)
Working Paper: Time Pressure and Risk Taking in Auctions: A Field Experiment (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:war:wpaper:2016-04
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