Rewarding truthful-telling in stated preference studies

Pierre-Alexandre Mahieu (), Romain Crastes, Jordan Louviere and Ewa Zawojska
Additional contact information
Romain Crastes: University of Leeds, Centre of Choice Modelling
Jordan Louviere: University of South Australia, School of Marketing

No 2016-33, Working Papers from Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw

Abstract: Stated preference surveys rarely provide conditions where a respondent’s optimal strategy is to answer truthfully. As a result, the reliability of stated preference data is often questioned. We consider a new approach economic theory-based approach to incentivize respondents to answer truthfully. Our approach is based on a lie detector coupled with a reward. We discuss theoretical predictions of the approach and test them empirically in a split sample choice experiment dealing with a tree planting program. We find lie detection (i) increases time spent to complete the valuation tasks and (ii) decreases the variance of the error term by using a hybrid choice model that accounts for possible endogeneity. Our results are encouraging but more research is needed to assess the validity of this new approach.

Keywords: stated preferences; truth-telling; choice experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q30 Q51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/index.php/download_file/3191/ First version, 2016 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:war:wpaper:2016-33

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