EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Institutional Framework of Central Bank Independence: Revisited

Jacek Lewkowicz, Michał Woźniak () and Michał Wrzesiński ()
Additional contact information
Michał Wrzesiński: Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw

No 2021-06, Working Papers from Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw

Abstract: The subject of central bank independence (CBI) and its consequences for monetary policy and economic development has been widely explored in public debate and research discourse. The main aim of the article is to analyze central bank independence, considering the institutional environment in a given country. Our primary focus is on the relevance of de jure provisions for de facto CBI, as well as on the importance of other structural factors. We rely on a dataset consisting of various novel indices to approximate these issues across multiple dimensions and apply advanced econometric tools to investigate our research tasks. The outcome of the study implies that the interrelationships between de jure and de facto CBI are observable. Thus, these conclusions may be successfully applied in institutional design and public policies regarding central banking.

Keywords: central bank independence; uncertainty; political economy; law & economics; institutional economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E50 E58 K20 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/index.php/download_file/6434/ First version, 2021 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:war:wpaper:2021-06

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marcin Bąba ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-02
Handle: RePEc:war:wpaper:2021-06