The effect of decentralization of government power on the character of public goods provision

Olga Marut () and Jacek Lewkowicz

No 2022-11, Working Papers from Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw

Abstract: What are the institutional drivers of public goods provision? What do we know about the impact of concentration of power on their distribution? The current literature proves the relevance of the allocation of public goods, mostly in the context of economic and social progress. A growing number of empirical studies is focused primarily on public policies that may matter in this context. However, we still know relatively little about institutional factors that may affect public goods provision. In this article we apply econometric and machine learning tools to verify the importance of governmental power decentralization for distribution of public goods. The obtained output implies that indeed concentration of power impacts public goods provision and the results are robust across various quantitative methods. Our conclusions may be of practical relevance also for policymakers.

Keywords: public goods; power decentralization; politics; institutional economics; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 H41 H72 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 64 pages
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big and nep-hme
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:war:wpaper:2022-11

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