Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Firms

John Burbidge, Katherine Cuff and John Leach
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John Leach: Department of Economics, McMaster University

No 5001, Working Papers from University of Waterloo, Department of Economics

Abstract: A model of tax competition in which firms earn rents is described. The size of these rents, coupled with the degree to which the firms are foreign-owned, determine the equilibrium tax rates. The existence of rents significantly alters some generally accepted results involving the possibility of a Pareto-improving common tax rate and the underprovision of publicly provided goods.

Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2005-01, Revised 2005-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tax competition with heterogeneous firms (2006)
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