Optimal At-Will Contracts

Ed Nosal

Working Papers from University of Waterloo, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper a stylized labour contarct model is constructed where it is shown that when contracts are enforced by a specific performance rule, then above mentioned unfortunate features emerge. Thse features 'disappear' when the environment is amended by assuming that the court uses an at-will rule to enforce contracts.

Keywords: CONTRACTS; ECONOMIC MODELS; GAME THEORY; LABOUR (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C73 C78 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wat:wpaper:9615

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