The Fight against Corruption: Taming Tigers and Swatting Flies

Lay Lian Chuah, Norman Loayza () and C. Bernard Myers

No 145050, Research and Policy Briefs from The World Bank

Abstract: Corruption robs the public of precious resources, distorts the incentives to engage in productive activities, destroys confidence in public institutions, and spurs political instability. It disproportionately harms the poor and vulnerable. In turn, corruption is the result of perverse incentives, concentration of power, and lack of accountability. Countries are not condemned to suffer from corruption. They can break the vicious cycle with a comprehensive approach that tackles country-specific governance gaps. This approach should include streamlining rules and regulations; building a meritocratic and well-paid civil service; promoting transparency in public employment, procurement, and services; enabling citizen voice and government accountability; and enforcing anti-corruption laws and penalties.

Keywords: National Governance; Social Policy; Judicial System Reform; Youth and Governance; Legal Reform; Government Policies; Public Sector Economics; Legislation; Legal Products; Public Finance Decentralization and Poverty Reduction; Regulatory Regimes; Governance Indicators; Educational Sciences; Public Sector Administrative&Civil Service Reform; Administrative&Civil Service Reform; Democratic Government; Public Sector Administrative and Civil Service Reform; De Facto Governments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lam and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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